Concerning the real strength of the armies involved, according to original sources the Castilian armies reached between 50 and 70,000 soldiers the years of the greatest military effort (1482, 83, 86, 87, 89 and 91), or 10,000 to 29,000 the more quieter ones (1484, 85, 88 and 90), strength which is accepted by modern scholars as Ladero Quesada.[24] Nevertheless, according to García de Gabiola to keep, pay and feed armies of such strength were beyond the resources of the recently birth modern states. For the campaigns in Italy (1494-1503) the Spanish armies were of 5,000, 9,000 or 15,000 men maximum, so it is rather surprising the numbers recorded 5–10 years before for Granada. If we take into account the revenues of Castile during the period (130 to some 200 millions of maravedies per year) it is hardly difficult that Castile could have organized more than 8,000 to 20,000 soldiers.[25] In fact, Ladero Quesada register the number of grain loads contracted by Castile in several years and García de Gabiola has calculated the number of soldiers that could have been fed through these grain loads, and his conclusions are 12,000 men for 1482 (siege of Loja); 8,000 men for 1483 and 1484 (Granada fields sacking); 10,000 men in 1485 (Ronda siege); 10-12,000 soldiers in 1486 (2nd Loja siege); 12,000 for 1487 (Malaga siege); 10-12,000 in 1488 (1st Baza siege); 20,000 soldiers in 1489 (2nd Baza siege, the greatest grain loads contracted, that also coincides with the largest revenue of Castile during the campaign, some 200 millions); and 10-12,000 men for 1490-91 (final siege of Granada). A 20% of them should be cavalry.[26]

Related to the Muslim armies, according to García de Gabiola,[27] the strengths mentioned by the sources (15,000 to 50,000 infantry, or 4,500-7,000 cavalry) should be also discarded. Some strengths also mentioned that are more trustful are 3,000 horses (1482), 1,000 to 1,500 (1483, 85 and 1487) or even 3-400 riders (1489 and 1491). Concerning the infantry, De Miguel Mora states that a Muslim soldier captured by the Castilians during the siege of Baza confessed that the real infantry strength of the garrison was 4,000 men and not 15,000.[28] So, the Muslim armies would not pass of some 4,000 infantry. At the end they were 2 or 3-to-1 against the odds in comparison to Castilian armies.

The Granada War would prove to be valuable training for Castile's participation in the Italian Wars, where the Castilian armies and tactics such as the tercio would acquit themselves well.[29]